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Abstract
This paper examines the history of nuclear energy, safety developments of reactors and
nuclear energy policy from the 1950s on. I investigate the effects of nuclear accidents on
energy policy with the help of a panel dataset of 31 countries from 1965-2009, using annual
data about the capacity of reactors under construction, primary energy consumption, as well
as three nuclear accidents scaled INES five or higher by the International Atomic Energy
Agency. After determining the extent of the accident impact in the different countries, I find
that neither Three Mile Island nor Lucens had a worldwide negative effect on construction
starts, while Chernobyl did. The effect of Chernobyl is however shown to wear-off in certain
geographical clusters, after ten to thirty years. I find that nuclear capacity enlargement shows
a significant persistence, but it was also driven by primary energy consumption in the past
five decades. The effects of real interest rates, inflation, or gross domestic product on reactor
construction were not found significant. Thus, an accident is likely to have a negative and
long lasting impact in the country where it happened, and possibly in countries affected by
the direct consequences, or where governments are subject to severe public pressure. It is
difficult to estimate the consequences Fukushima is going to have on worldwide power plant
constructions, but areas closer to the accident might be affected more negatively and for a
longer time. Growing concerns of energy supply security and greenhouse gas emissions may
counteract this impact at the legislative level.
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1 Introduction
Energy policy, including the decision on the energy mix is formed and shaped by many factors,
encompassing energy security, the availability of resources, the growth of energy demand, public
pressure, and environmental concerns. In the recent years until Fukushima, the notion of a
nuclear renaissance emerged and many, mostly Asian countries started aggressive nuclear energy
programs. The United States has also passed laws to boost its nuclear industry. Nuclear energy
is a clean option, with minimal greenhouse gas emissions, and a secure long term resource supply.
Uranium has little share in the price of nuclear generated electricity, which is therefore resistant
to commodity price fluctuations. The nuclear industry is however facing the challenge of high
up-front financing requirements, energy policy changes over the lifespan of reactor (40-60 years),
besides the questions of waste management, security, safety and proliferation.
New nuclear technologies have become in the course of the years more homogeneous, safer
and more efficient. Built-in safety measures have had a large share in mitigating the damage
resulting from the Fukushima accident, which had also a significantly lower fallout than Chernobyl.
Despite these apparent technical facts, there have been immediate policy reactions against nuclear
energy in a number of countries. Other states seem at the moment to go ahead with their
nuclear programs. Already, in a 2009 study, Joskow and Parsons (2009) noted that “another
significant accident at an existing nuclear power plant anywhere in the world could have very
negative consequences for any hope of a nuclear renaissance.” (Joskow and Parsons (2009), page
25, electronic version) In this paper I will study the effect of a nuclear accident on the capacity of
reactors under construction, along with the regional differences observable, while also investigating
the impact of energy consumption and of the major economic variables affecting the profitability
of a nuclear power plant.
The effects of nuclear accidents on energy policy have been discussed in a number of studies,
among others in Ebinger (2011), Nohrstedt (2005), Nohrstedt (2008), and in Goodfellow, Williams,
and Azapagic (2011). Most of these articles deal with the psychology or the politics of
after accident policy making. There are only a handful of econometric studies, such as from
Fuhrmann (2012) and from Gourley and Stulberg (2010) examining the driving forces of reactor
construction. This study contributes to closing this gap by examining the statistical impact of
energy consumption, of the main accidents and of a number of economic variables on reactor
constructions worldwide. I find that next to energy consumption, and energy security, the lock-in
effect is a very strong driving factor in the nuclear industry, and of the three major accidents
examined, only Chernobyl had a significant negative worldwide impact on constructions. The
effect of nuclear accidents can, but need not wear-off in a time span of ten to thirty years. An
accident is likely to have a long lasting negative impact in the country where it happened, and
possibly in regions most affected by the nuclear fallout, or where governments are subject to severe
public pressure.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives a short overview of the connected literature.
Section 3 examines the economic and policy environment of nuclear energy during the past five
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decades, elaborates on the safety features of nuclear reactors, as well as on the causes of the major
nuclear accidents. Section 4 presents and explains our empirical results, and in Section 5 policy
implications are derived.
2 Literature
At the moment only a handful of econometric studies examining the consequences of accidents on
nuclear policy and on capacity development exist. Fuhrmann (2012) investigates the motives of
nuclear power plant construction using a logit model to test the significance of nuclear accidents,
economic development, nuclear proliferation, energy security, the supply of nuclear technology and
of norms as the determinants of nuclear power plant construction. He comes to the conclusion
that economic development is positively and significantly influencing reactor construction, while
energy security is negatively related to it, meaning that the lower the ratio of own energy supply to
consumption, the more likely that a country will indulge in power plant construction. Fuhrmann
(2012) did not find the nuclear weapons, or nuclear non-proliferation treaty variables significant,
implying that enrolling in a civilian nuclear program does not mean sinister intentions from the
beginning, although there is no evidence that these intentions might not change. The supply side
variable is also insignificant, while the tests on both the Three Mile Island (TMI) and Chernoby
dummies show a serious and significant impact on nuclear power plant constructions. Fuhrmann
(2012) concludes that nuclear power plant construction is likely to continue in countries which
had invested in nuclear technology and infrastructure before the Fukushima accident, but the
probability that new countries will enrol in civilian nuclear programs is drastically lowered. He
finds it doubtful that nuclear energy will play a meaningful role in global climate change mitigation.
Gourley and Stulberg (2010) investigate the correlates of nuclear energy using a binary logistic
regression on the occurrence of construction starts. They look at the characteristics systematically
shared by existing nuclear power states that distinguish them from non-nuclear states. They
find that energy insecurity is positively correlated with nuclear energy capacity as are GDP per
capita levels, however they do not find evidence for common traits in economic growth, political
governance, regime duration, or strategic considerations such as enduring rivalries (hostilities).
They note that aspirant nuclear states tend to be either large emerging market economies or
smaller, but fast growing nations. Nelson (2010) conducted a stepwise regression on nuclear
reliance (defined as the fraction of national electricity generated from nuclear energy). He found
that coal reserves and the state of the fuel cycle are negatively correlated while international
commerce & polity, and energy insecurity are positively correlated with nuclear reliance. Gross
domestic product, gas reserves or electricity generation were not found significant. The results of
this study were questioned however by Gourley and Stulberg (2010) due to the methodological
problems associated with it.
To understand the implications of carrying out a statistical analysis on nuclear energy, we
must also cover two important aspects outside the scope of econometrics. Both the political and
psychological environment surrounding the nuclear industry might play a vital role in influencing
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future investment decisions. In this section we shall review the prevailing studies on risk perception
regarding nuclear power. It is important to bring in the psychological aspect into the analysis of
nuclear power, as in no other case is the perceived risk of an energy form so exorbitantly different
from the expected risk (Slovic (1987)). The resulting public pressure may, but need not have an
impact on policy. How much public pressure influences policy making varies country by country,
depending on cultural aspects, political systems, wealth levels, but also on closeness to elections.
Risk perception studies (Slovic (1987), Corner et al. (2001), Goodfellow, Williams, and Azapagic
(2011)), examine the “judgements of people about hazardous technologies and activities” (Slovic
(1987), page 280). In his cornerstone study, Slovic (1987) noted “that laboratory research on basic
perceptions and cognition has shown that difficulties in understanding probabilistic processes,
biased media coverage, misleading personal experiences, and the anxieties generated by life’s
gambles cause uncertainty to be denied and risks to be misjudged.” (Slovic (1987), page 281).
Using psychometric factor scales, Slovic (1987) finds that people rate nuclear power risks both as
dreaded and unknown, reflecting views that the risk is uncontrollable, catastrophic and is likely to
affect future generations. These evaluations are in harsh contrast with the evaluation of experts.
Slovic (1987) notes that risk perception research demonstrates that peoples’ deep anxieties are
linked to the reality of extensive unfavourable media coverage and to a strong association between
nuclear power and the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. He comes to the conclusion that
a risk communication processes should be a two-way between experts and the public. Goodfellow,
Williams, and Azapagic (2011) also come to the conclusion that the public perceives nuclear power
as a high risk activity, although further research has shown that people who live in countries with
existing nuclear power generation capacity tend to be more positive about nuclear power than
those from countries without existing capacity (Goodfellow, Williams, and Azapagic (2011)).
Their study argues that policies are needed, including an increased integration of lay public risk
perceptions into the design process for nuclear power plants (NPP). In a different study, Corner
et al. (2001) have investigated the acceptance of nuclear power among the British public and found
that the opinions are still very much divided. However, at the same time concerns about climate
change and energy security are widespread, which carry the potential to increase conditional public
acceptance of nuclear power, given that other preferred options (renewables) have been exhausted.
Another important social topic that has to be addressed is the external cost of an energy source.
The calculated or expected risk of a nuclear accident, depending on reactor type ranges from 10 5
to 10 7 pro reactor year. Thus, the probabilistic risk of an accident associated with nuclear energy
compared to any other energy form is among the lowest. Laes, Meskens, and Sluijs (2011) examine
the external cost calculations of the ExternE project. The ExternE estimated the external costs
for different energy types and came to the conclusion that both renewable and nuclear power show
very limited external costs, generally lower than 1 Euro/MWh, gas technologies have intermediate
external costs between 10-30 Euro/MWh, and traditional oil and coal technologies fall generally
within the high range of external cost of 30-150 Euro/MWh. Laes, Meskens, and Sluijs (2011) note
that this expected value has been criticized in particular for ignoring risk aversion. The authors
come to the conclusion that unless full indemnity insurance is required from the nuclear sector,
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it is impossible to calculate the true cost of nuclear power. The question of indemnity insurance
has been regulated differently in countries with nuclear energy, the most notable regulation is
the Price-Anderson Act in the United States. As the empirical studies about risk perception and
public opinion above also demonstrate, the public perceives nuclear energy at best as a high risk
activity, a dreaded and uncontrollable menace at worst, irrespective of the true risk of associated
with the commercial use of nuclear power. Policy decisions by governments are thus shaped not
only by strategic questions of energy security, safety and energy demand, but also by the prevailing
public opinion.
A policy change may take the form of an incremental process, or may come instantly, as a
reaction to a major crisis. What moves governments to immediate policy changes in the face
of a crisis may be triggered by different causes. A crisis is defined according to Rosenthal and
Kouzmin (1997) as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms
of a social system, which—under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances—necessitates
making critical decisions” (Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1997), page 280). Presently, there is no fully
developed theory explaining the crisis - policy change interactions. One of the most frequently
used thesis is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) of policy change. The basic premises
of the framework require external perturbations to a subsystem, either in the form of major
socioeconomic changes, public opinion shifts, changes in the system of governing coalition and
policy decisions or impacts from another subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993)). These
external events may redistribute resources, and may also offer opportunities for minor coalitions,
without sufficient power. Whether an external event will cause a policy change or not, is not easily
determined. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) claim, that core beliefs change rarely, but could
as a result to a major external shock. Nohrstedt (2005) has examined the applicability and the
shortcomings of the advocacy coalition framework from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), on the
example of the Swedish referendum after the Three Mile Island Accident. After TMI the Swedish
liberal government called a referendum, backed by the social democrats (SAP) that resulted in
the decision to phase out nuclear energy by 2010. Nohrstedt (2005) claims that contrary to the
predictions of the ACF, short-term interests can be important in explaining major policy change.
Nohrstedt (2005) points out that the notion of revised policy believes is problematic. His major
critique of the framework is that “it does not assume actors to be driven by economical/political
self-interest goals” (Nohrstedt (2005), page 1045). Self-interests, such as power maximisation
are extensively viewed as a powerful explanation of political decision making. Nohrstedt (2005)
suggests thus, that “a major policy change is more likely as a result to an external shock, if the
incumbent coalition member perceives threats to basic interests, or an opportunity to advance
basic interests” (Nohrstedt (2005), page 1045). Nohrstedt (2005) further argues that political
interests should be regarded to include next to vote maximisation, office seeking, policy seeking,
and party cohesion. Since socio-economic changes occur constantly, it is also a matter of degree, or
the depth and importance of that change that determines whether and when such a development
triggers a policy move. There is no uniform rule explaining the dynamics how an event may
stimulate policy change. Examining the TMI case and the referendum initiated afterwards, he
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finds that image and short-term political interests were in fact the major drivers. Nohrstedt (2005)
comes to the conclusion that without TMI, no referendum about nuclear energy would have taken
place. Nohrstedt (2008) also examines the policy impact of Chernobyl, when–albeit the immense
public pressure–no decision was taken by the ruling coalition to speed up the nuclear phase out.
As a matter of fact, the government actions after TMI, which allowed the loading of fuel rods into
new plants, and the construction of further nuclear facilities also highly questioned the seriousness
of the phase out. These developments are difficult to explain by any prevailing theory.
Notable policy changes next to the Swedish referendum included the referendum in Italy (1987)
that resulted in the shut-down of all four nuclear plants after Chernobyl, the decision of Finland
to halt construction, that was revised by 2005, when Finland as the first European country
began the construction of a European Pressure Water Reactor (EPR). Belgium, whose energy is
supplied approximately 50% by the existing nuclear plants, decided in 2003 to phase out nuclear
energy, while a similar German decision from 2000 was reversed before Fukushima, allowing for
the extension of the lifetime of existing reactors. After Fukushima the German government has
passed a constitutional law, requiring the shut-down of German nuclear power plants, which
generated approximately 18% of the country’s electricity, or approximately 20 GWe capacity.
Other countries, such as the United States, passed no explicit laws against nuclear energy; it is
notable however that after TMI no new construction started for approximately 30 years. The
new Vogtle plants in the United States are presently the first reactors in construction after the
Harrisburg accident. A policy change must not be exorbitantly spectacular, or visible, such as the
German, Swedish or Italian. It can take the form of a “latent” decision, in which case the general
economic and legal conditions surrounding nuclear power are worsened, and authorization process
becomes more difficult.
3 Five decades of commercial nuclear energy
3.1 Nuclear energy economics and policy
This section looks closely at the historical and economic factors that have shaped the nuclear
industry as well as the surrounding energy policy during the last fifty years. In the wake of
the Second World War, civilian reactor technology was initially developed from the military
applications of nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established
in 1957 to promote the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. The first commercial
reactors were built in the first half of the 1950s in the US, in the USSR, and in West Europe.
Arising from the novelty of the technology, many different reactor designs were experimented
with in this era (Lester and Rosner (2009)), a number of which either did not prove economically
viable, or other technically better designs were favoured instead. This was also the era of the Cold
War, when nuclear armament was a strategic priority for both the United States and the Eastern
Block.
A rapid worldwide commercial expansion of nuclear reactors followed towards the end of the
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1960s, irrespective of the ownership structure of the plants (state vs. privately owned plants).
However, the 1970s brought a significant change to the international energy landscape. The oil
crisis of 1973-74 sent the global inflation and interest rates sky-rocketing in the Western World. In
addition, in the United States–partially due to the high costs of the Vietnam War–the USD was
decoupled from the gold backing in 1971, and started a downhill race contributing additionally
to high inflationary pressures. As a result of high energy prices, the demand for end user energy
and energy services broke in considerably, while energy efficiencies began to kick-in, in various
technologies. Interestingly, this phenomenon at the time was not observable in the USSR and in
the countries of the Warsaw Pact, as the USSR not only had large own oil and gas reserves, but
also regulated resource and energy prices. It is argued that in an environment of high interest
rates and high inflation, large base load power plants (such as nuclear plants) with high initial
investment costs became especially uncompetitive. As Ebinger (2011) notes, the demand for large
base load was growing annually 6-7 % in the 1960s, and started falling 1-2% after the first oil crisis.
Apart from this, as Ebinger (2011) mentions, a very complicated authorization process evolved
in the United States, with the federal regulators and state regulators all doing their independent
reviews on construction and operational licenses, that also increased the time needed to build a
nuclear plant. Occasionally, costs increased ten fold compared to the budgets in the high inflation
area.
By 1979 the nuclear industry was already fighting with overcapacity, high investment costs
and inflation, growing public, environmental, and proliferation concerns. It was in this year,
when the Three Mile Island accident happened. As described in a later section, the release of
radioactivity–mostly thank to the very robust building of the plant–was well under the health
safety limits, and there are even after thirty years no deaths or illnesses attributable to TMI
(Van Roey (2009)). The accident however received tremendous media attention, and a local public
panic ensued. Contributing factors could have been the release of the film “China Syndrome” two
weeks before the event, or an evacuation order given by the nuclear regulatory body–based on
false information regarding the measurement of released radioactivity–that was later withdrawn.
According to Ebinger (2011), after TMI nearly 100 orders for nuclear reactors were cancelled in
the United States, and only one reactor (where construction started in 1976) was finished. Many
investments were scrapped, among others nearly-ready plants (Joskow and Parsons (2009)). It
is argued that TMI, although it had a large echo, had just finished off what the stagflation and
high interest rates of the decade have started (Cohen (1990)). The worldwide number of nuclear
power plant construction starts had significantly fallen already starting with 1977. Apart from the
United States, TMI could have triggered the Swedish referendum on nuclear energy, that resulted
in the long-term phase out of nuclear plants in Sweden (as of the end of 2010 still about 2/3 of
plants were in operation).
The beginning of the 1980s was marked once again by a severe oil crisis boosting the price of oil,
and resulting in significant reductions in end-energy use, but also in primary energy consumption.
Interestingly again, the effects were not visible in the USSR and Warsaw Pact Block, for the
reasons mentioned above. Natural gas, but also coal drills marked the first part of the decade,
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along with the deregulation of gas and oil prices in the United States. In 1985, Saudi Arabia
for reasons that are up to today disputed, (according to Reynolds and Kolodziej (2008) either
to punish the rest of the OPEC members who were unable of agreeing on production cuts, or to
boost its own revenues, or to do a favour to the United States) increased its output from 2 million
barrels to 6 million barrels per day. Oil prices broke in as a result, which not only helped to
boost most Western economies, but also cut the main revenue source of the USSR. It was in these
circumstances that the biggest nuclear accident of all times happened in Ukraine. The disaster
at Chernobyl was not only due to a bad reactor design, but also to enormous human errors, and
the complete disregard of safety procedures (Villa (2008)). The accident contaminated significant
areas of Europe, and caused a large public outcry against nuclear energy. It is worth mentioning
however, that the radiation doses released from Chernobyl for West Europe were less than the
doses that resulted from the atmospheric nuclear bomb tests during the 1950s (Böck and Villa
(2011)). Apart from a few countries that kept their nuclear programs, in most parts of the world,
new construction starts fell dramatically.
The last twenty years were characterized worldwide by the widespreading of small and medium
capacity gas and coal plants (Joskow and Parsons (2009)), but also by the remarkable increase
in commodity prices starting in the early 2000s until the great financial depression of 2008.
Liberalisation and quasi-liberalisation of electric markets sped up in West Europe but also in
Eastern Europe and in the former USSR. Especially in the East Block, the adjustment to market
prices has caused drastic increases in energy prices, along with a very strong downward pressure
on energy consumption. Primary energy consumption of the former East Block decreased by 2010
to the level of the 1970s, after a peak around 1990. In the US, deregulation marked the 1990s,
but these efforts suffered considerably as a result of the California Electricity Crisis in 2000-2001.
During the past decade, due to the high and fluctuating oil and gas prices, as well as to
the increasing concerns related to climate change attributable to greenhouse gas emissions from
carbon dioxide and methane and to the looming problem of energy security, many states have
again realistically considered utilising nuclear power (Joskow and Parsons (2009), Lester and
Rosner (2009)). It is as a clean, concentrated and secure energy source that had – apart from the
disaster at Chernobyl – a very good safety record. Among others, President Obama initiated a
stimulus package to boost the building of new nuclear power plants. China, India, and a number
of Asian states also turned to nuclear energy to satisfy their strongly growing energy needs. China
passed a “Medium and Long-term Nuclear Power Development Plan” (Zhou, Renfigo, Chen, and
Hinze (2011)), running until 2020, to build new nuclear capacity of around 40 GW(e). Later
these plans were reassessed and are currently around 70-80 GW(e), almost 7-8 fold of the existing
nuclear capacity in 2010 (Zhou, Renfigo, Chen, and Hinze (2011)). The conditions faced by the
nuclear industry in China compared to those in the Western economies are distinctly different.
While in China the industry is characterized by competing state owned corporations, backed by
a firm government decision towards capacity enlargement, in the United States and Europe the
privately owned nuclear industry is competing with natural gas and shale gas plants, with much
lower initial investment, faster construction times, and less regulatory hazard.
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On March 11th 2011, a 9.0 earthquake hit Japan, and the resulting tsunami devastated large
coastal areas. Due to the loss of the emergency cooling system caused by the tsunami, the
operating company TEPCO reported a (partial) meltdown in three of the damaged reactors of the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The exact status of the fuel will however not be certain
until much longer, when the reactor core can be properly inspected. The question concerning the
impact Fukushima will have on the energy policy of different countries, is one that this study is
investigating.
3.2 Safety features and technical development of reactors
In this section I present a short overview on the development of basic reactor safety and efficiency
during the past fifty years. Not only did present reactor designs become much safer with
built-in passive safety measures, but their efficiency has also increased greatly. As noted earlier,
commercial nuclear power technology originally developed from military use, and many plants
were built during the Cold War era. Undeniably, the historical and political setting played an
important role in reactor technology. For instance, in the former USSR, RBMK reactors were
designed to breed weapon grade plutonium besides their commercial operations, necessitating a
reactor design where safety suffered for this reason.
Also, perhaps one of the most significant strategic setbacks for the nuclear power prospects in
the United States were the many different reactor designs of the 1970s. All built by private utilities,
the plants had to go through separate licensing processes, lacking thus homogeneity that would
have not only facilitated safety, but also efficiency. When China embarked on its nuclear program
in the early 2000s, the explicit drive for homogeneity was a prerequisite, and consequently only a
few reactor designs are officially supported and pursued. At the moment, the majority of operating
reactors around the world are pressurized water reactors, followed by boiling water reactors, and
Canadian pressurized heavy water reactors (CANDUs). A small amount of gas cooled reactors,
including MAGNOX reactors and advanced gas cooled reactors (AGRs) are currently producing
electricity, as well as Chernobyl type RBMKs, and two fast breeder reactors. The total number
of reactors worldwide as of December 2010 was 441, with a total installed capacity of 375 GW(e).
Without embarking on the specifics of each reactor type, which may significantly differ in
design, I summarise the most important inherent technological reactor safety features in the next
sections, most of which are supported by simple physical principles. One important built-in safety
feature is the so called ”negative void coefficient”. In water moderated reactors water slows down
neutrons (moderates), and also acts as a neutron absorber. When the water in the reactor core
starts to boil due to higher temperatures and thus steam forms, neutrons are not slowed down any
more. Fast neutrons can fission only a small percentage of nuclei of what thermal neutrons do.
Consequently, fission will slow, and eventually break down. Both pressurized water reactors and
boiling water reactors possess this feature. Markedly, graphite moderated reactors including the
Russian built RBMK reactors lack this effect and have positive void coefficients. In this case, when
water evaporates, it fails to absorb neutrons, to cool and transport the cumulating heat. However,
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graphite continues moderating and thus does not allow for an automatic stop of the chain reaction,
eventually reactivity increases. Apart from these, CANDU reactors have also a small positive void
coefficient that they have to compensate for with different measures. MAGNOX reactors are gas
cooled and thus the void coefficient is not relevant for this type of reactor.
The most important feature, the Doppler-effect describes the phenomenon that occurs with
the rise of the temperature. The atoms and molecules start vibrating faster, and consequently
increase their neutron uptake, which also leads to higher absorption and reduction to the number of
fissions. A built-in SCRAM system and independent shut down systems are a basic requirement
for each design. SCRAM is a fast shut down system that requires the automatic insertion of
control rods–usually material with very large neutron capture cross section–within 3,5 seconds
after recognition of non-normal operations (Böck and Villa (2011)). Besides these, reactor safety
regulations require today the strict separation of redundant systems, a sound containment building
above the reactor pressure vessel, and a full capacity emergency core cooling system. Another
safety measure is that the heavy mass component should be placed in the lowest position. A
serious critique of the Russian built water moderated VVER 1000 reactors today is that the core
is not at the lowest point.
Specific developments in the past decades were the introduction of passive safety features for
emergency cooling, operating also in the presence of power loss. For BWRs, such as the newer
type SWR 1000 or ABWR, water from a core flooding pool will flow, in case the water level drops
in the pressure vessel (Böck and Villa (2011)). Certain boiling water reactors also have passive
pressure pulse transmitters. A drop of the water level increases pressure on the secondary side,
which delivers safety related pulses, and scrams the reactor without external power. This gives a
grace period of three days without intervention. A built-in safety feature of newer EPRs is a core
catcher designed in case the corium escapes the reactor pressure vessel (Böck and Villa (2011)).
The EPR structure is designed to avoid steam explosions between the molten corium and water.
It is most important that a dry reactor area has to be maintained before corium flooding. The
newer pressurized water reactors, especially the AP1000, are greatly simplified with significantly
lower number of tubes, pipes, valves, but larger safety margins (Böck and Villa (2011)).
Important challenges faced by nuclear power include the question of plutonium creation and
nuclear waste. From the array of presently operating plants, MAGNOX and CANDU reactors
create more plutonium than conventional pressurized water and boiling water reactors. RBMK
reactors on the other hand were designed for easy weapon grade plutonium access. Answers
to the problem of plutonium included its extraction from the waste, and re-usage as a MOX
fuel. Another, presently not commercially practised procedure is the application of fast burners.
Plutonium and other transuranic elements can be fissioned in fast reactors. If the breeding ratio is
set below one, these fast reactors can operate effectively to fission “away” accumulated transuranic
elements, and reduce the amount of high level nuclear waste.
Apart from the inherent technical features, there are a number of regulatory and procedural
rules documented by the IAEA to ensure reactor safety. The IAEA “Basic Safety Principles for
Nuclear Power Plants” (1999) guideline mentions among its specific principles, next to siting,
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the importance of design. Under design, it elaborates on the specific requirements relating to
emergency plans, plant process control systems, automatic safety systems, radiation protection,
protection against power transient accidents, reactor core integrity, normal heat removal, startup,
shutdown and low power operation safety, emergency heat removal, reactor coolant system
integrity, the confinement of radioactive material, preservation of control capability, monitoring
of plant safety status, station blackout (simultaneous loss of on and off site power), plant
physical protection, and spent fuel storage. Apart from these, very high quality standards and
continuous inspection is required in the manufacturing and construction phase. The IAEA gives
detailed instructions on the commissioning and operating phase, including the necessity of safety
reviews, trainings, maintenance, testing, inspection, and feedback of operating experience. Other
parts of the specific principles deal with accident management, decommissioning and emergency
preparedness.
The efficiency of nuclear power plants is determined by many factors. The burnup of a reactor
gives the electricity generated by one ton of heavy metal fuel. One ton of 4-5 % enriched uranium
fuel contains about 40-50 kg U235, and about 10,25 tons of natural uranium are used in assembling
the fuel. If the thermal efficiency factor of 33% is met, the electricity generated will be around
370-400 million kWh from a 4-5 % enriched fuel. This gives the burnup of about 45-50 gigawatt-
days/metric ton of heavy metal (GWd/MTHM), a general burnup of a light water reactor. Boiling
water reactors have higher burnups up to 50-60 GWd/MTHM, for fast breeders a burnup of 100
GWd/MTHM has been assumed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2011). The burnup
could be increased by increasing the thermal to electrical power conversion. While a regular PWR
works at around 34 % conversion efficiency, an advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) can reach
37,2 %, while advanced high temperature reactors (AHTR) and supercritical water moderated
reactors can achieve 47%. The notion of base load is also important in determining the efficiency
and profitability of a plant. Nuclear power plants are often not running at full capacity, although
it would be sensible to run them as base load plants.
3.3 Description of notable nuclear accidents
In this section I describe three notable accidents in detail, which are widely regarded to have
had the biggest policy impact and public reaction, for various reasons. These are the Three
Mile Island accident (1979), the Chernobyl disaster (1986) and the Fukushima nuclear accident
(2011). As we will see, the actual severity of an accident is often not the main factor in causing
grave policy impacts. Other non-technical issues, such as public perception and fear resulting
from a not-well understood technology and negative media coverage will in a certain environment
lead to significant pressure on policy makers. Policy impacts are not only reflected in illustrious
decisions like that of the German government in 2011 to phase out nuclear energy, but also in the
strengthening of licensing and the withdrawal of government guarantees.
The IAEA adopted the International Nuclear Event and Radiological Scale (INES) in 1990, to
“communicate to the public in a consistent way the safety significance of nuclear and radiological
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events” (International Atomic Energy Agency (1990), page 1). The scale encompasses seven levels,
of which levels four (4) to seven (7) are classified as accidents, and levels two (2) to three (3) as
incidents. In practice, the classification of an accident or incident is carried out by national
authorities or by the operators of nuclear power plants. One potential bias from using the INES
scale arises from the fact, that the INES database was only developed in the early 1990s and does
not contain information on events prior to that (International Atomic Energy Agency (1996)),
save for a few spectacular cases. There were a number of accidents or incidents during the 1950s
to 1980s where classification is currently not available, although experts might rate them up to
level five (5). The Los Alamos National Laboratory however compiled a database of criticality
accidents (Los Alamos National Laboratory (2000)), and the IAEA also published a list of serious
incidents (International Atomic Energy Agency (1996)).
Currently, two accidents are rated level seven (7), or a major accident, which is defined by
the (IAEA(1990), page 4) as a “major release of radioactive material with widespread health and
environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.” These
events are the nuclear accidents at Chernobyl (1986) and in Fukushima (2011). Although both
cases fall into the highest category, by comparing the technical facts it becomes apparent that
both the amount and the type of radionuclide released into the environment, as well as the extent
of the contaminated areas are significantly lower in case of Fukushima. Only one event is rated at
level six (6), “a serious accident, with significant release of radioactive material, likely to require
the implementation of planned countermeasures” (International Atomic Energy Agency (1990),
page 4). The Kyshtym accident occurred in the former USSR in 1957, where the cooling system
of a high level radioactive waste storage failed, and a steam explosion caused by decay heat has
led to the release of significant amount of radioactive material in the environment, mostly Cs137
and Sr90, both of which are highly volatile materials. This event happened at a military facility,
and consequently it received very little media coverage either in the USSR or in the West.
There are a few level five (5) events, including among others the Windscale (UK, 1957), Rocky
Flats (US, 1957), the First Chalk River (CAN, 1952), the Lucens (CH, 1969) and the famous
Three Mile Island (US, 1979) accidents. This level is defined as “limited release of radioactive
material likely to require implementation of some planned countermeasures; several deaths from
radiation. Severe damage to reactor core, and release of large quantities of radioactive material
within an installation with a high probability of significant public exposure. This could arise
from a major criticality accident or fire” (International Atomic Energy Agency (1990), page 4).
Level four (4) events, or accidents with local consequences are defined as “the minor release
of radioactive material unlikely to result in implementation of planned countermeasures, other
than local food controls. At least one death from radiation. Fuel melt down or damage to
fuel resulting in more than 0,1% release of core inventory. Release of significant quantities of
radioactive material within an installation with a high probability of significant public exposure”
(International Atomic Energy Agency (1990), page 4). There have been a number of level four
cases throughout the years, such as the SL-1 with a prompt criticality due to removal of central
control rod, (US, 1961), several incidents at Sellafield (UK), or the Tokai Mura accident (Japan,
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1999). We now turn to the description of first the Three Mile Island accident, then to Chernobyl
and Fukushima, to examine the extent of these events and the actual damage caused.
3.3.1 Three Mile Island (level 5)
The Three Mile Island nuclear accident on March 28th 1979 was initiated by a series of small
technical failures that turned into a serious mishap, partially due to the lack of nuclear engineering
knowledge of the operating staff, but also due to the very confusing and complex design of the
control systems, that made it practically impossible for the staff dealing with the emergency to
filter out important information. The Three Mile Island Unit 2 was a pressurized water reactor
design, connected to the gird exactly one year earlier. A pressurized water reactor has three
separate cooling circuits. The primary circuit cools the reactor itself, and transports the heat
from the fission. This circuit is under 150-155 bar pressure to ensure water stays liquid under very
high temperatures. The secondary circuit cools the first circuit and works as a steam generator.
When the water of the secondary circuit takes up the heat from the primary circuit, it boils and
the resulting steam drives the turbines to produce electricity. The condenser circuit is cooling the
steam in the secondary circuit, and thus transforming it back to water.
According to a study by Van Roey (2009), accident started out when at the second unit of the
TMI plant the main water pump stopped at the secondary circuit, eliminating the cooling water
supply to the steam generator, therefore temperature and pressure in the primary circuit started
to rise. After nine seconds, the control rods as designed dropped into the reactor, shutting it
down. Although the fission stopped, the decay heat would have had to be removed from the core.
The emergency water pumps started at the secondary side as designed, but a valve was closed due
to earlier maintenance, so the water could not reach the secondary side of the steam generator
(Böck and Villa (2011)). This mistake was only noticed and eliminated eight minutes later. As
the temperature rose in the reactor, the water in the primary circuit started to evaporate, and
the pressure relief valve at the top of the pressuriser opened. However, when the pressure has
sufficiently decreased in the system, the valve did not close as foreseen. The operators in the
control room could not see this because the status of the open valve was not displayed on the
control panel (Böck and Villa (2011)). From this moment on, a large amount of primary water
began to escape through the open valve into a drain tank. Due to the insufficient cooling, the
reactor core began to overheat and steam bubbles formed. Two pumps pushed extra water into the
primary circuit, but one was manually closed by the operators, who, at the time still did not realise
that the water was escaping. Due to the mixture of water and steam that the primary pumps
had to deal with, they started vibrating. To prevent consequent damage to the pumps, they were
completely turned off, cutting all water supply to the fuel (Van Roey (2009)). The temperature in
the core kept rising. No one at this point noticed that they were losing coolant. The core became
partly uncovered and the zirconium cladding of the uranium fuel rods broke off, and started
melting. It is estimated that the temperature could have risen to 5000 degrees (Van Roey (2009)).
About half of the core melted down by the time the engineers of the operating company arrived
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at the site and discovered that the valve was open, which they closed immediately. At this point
radioactive particles already escaped the reactor through the open valve with the contaminated
cooling water. Despite of the core melting, it speaks for the robustness of the reactor design that
the corium did not penetrate its way through the reactor pressure vessel (Van Roey (2009)). This
could also be due to a thin layer of water in-between the pressure vessel steel and the corium
(Böck and Villa (2011)), and thus the biggest disaster was avoided. The cooling of the core was
resumed soon after with high pressure emergency water, that compressed the bubbles. During
the evening the primary pumps could be turned on without significant vibration.
About a day later due to the high temperature, water vapour reacted with the zirconium
cladding, and formed hydrogen. There was a high probability of a hydrogen explosion that
experts worked on to hinder with all possible measures, among others by opening the valve above
the pressurizer. The accident above is a known as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Some
radioactivity did escape through the open valve into the drain tank, and through the controlled
opening of the valve to reduce pressure later on. Radioactive gas also found its way to the auxiliary
building through the pipe systems, and escaped to the environment (Van Roey (2009)). It took
about a month to reach a cold shut down condition, where water could be circulated in the reactor
below the boiling point. The cleanup and decontamination operations are estimated to have cost
about 1 billion dollars (Van Roey (2009)). The reactor core was first inspected with a camera
in 1984, and dismantling of the reactor started in 1985 and finished in 1990. The exposure to
the public was well below health levels during the entire time. Exposure to ionizing radiation
is measured as absorbed dose in Gray (Gy) The “effective dose” measured in Sievert (Sv) takes
account of the amount of ionizing radiation in energy absorbed, the type of radiation and the
susceptibility of various organs and tissues to radiation damage (Hajek (2012)). It is estimated
that people within a radius of 16 km have received about 0,08 mSv radiation (Van Roey (2009)).
The average dose in Europe coming from the cosmic radiation and the background radiation is
around 2 mSv a year. Medical applications such as CTs and x-rays, as well as intercontinental
flights can increase this dose significantly, up to 10 mSv per year. Up to now no study has found
any health effect of Three Mile Island, on infant mortality, or on cancer (Böck and Villa (2011)).
An interesting fact, and highlighting the over-complicated organization of nuclear power utilities
in the United States was that the same valve dysfunction happened 18 months earlier at Davis
Besse, and although the engineers requested that all similar plants should be notified about the
deficiency of the pressure valve, this information was lost in the administrative process.
3.3.2 Chernobyl (level 7)
The largest nuclear disaster of our times happened in Chernobyl (Ukraine) on April 26th 1986.
The accident was caused by a mixture of bad reactor design, a faultily designed experiment, and
the breaching of a number of safety regulations by the operators carrying out the experiment.
The reactor in question was a light water cooled, graphite moderated pressure tube reactor.
Originally these reactors were constructed to fulfil also military purposes, and thus allowed for
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on-load refuelling. The main purpose of this feature was to divert sufficient amounts of weapon
grade plutonium (Pu239) from the core.
Very simply put, the neutrons resulting from the fission of the U235 or any other nuclide might
follow two paths. In the first path they cause fission as fast neutrons. Fast neutrons, possessing
a kinetic energy of over 1,1 MeV are capable of fissioning also fertile nuclide such as U238. Fast
fission is however a negligible part of the total fission process. In the second path neutrons
are slowed down by moderators such as water or graphite and are either causing fission, or are
parasitically absorbed by U238 or any other nuclide that accumulated during the operations of
the reactor. By the absorption of a neutron and a successive beta decay U238 will form Pu239
which is again a fissile material. The reason that the entire fuel in a reactor cannot be consumed,
is the gradual increase in the amount of parasitic absorbers with time. The major absorbers are
Xe135, Sm149 and Sm151. Parasitic absorbers, especially Xenon135, played a significant part
in the Chernobyl accident (Villa (2008)). These short half-life fission products are sometimes
also referred to as reactor poisons, or nuclear poisons. During normal operations, absorbers are
formed, but with neutron capture they are also destroyed. Xe135, which is formed from I135
reaches its maximum after the shut-down of the reactor, therefore a restart of a reactor is only
possible after the sufficient decrease in the amount of neutron poisons. For Xenon, this would
first be possible after 40 hours. During the shut-down phase Xenon contributes to large amounts
of negative reactivity. With a new start-up of the reactor, it should be regarded however that due
to burning of the reactor poisons, positive reactivity sets in (Villa (2008)).
The Chernobyl accident started out as a simple test. In case of a power cut, it was known
that the diesel generators supplying the water pumps of the cooling system with electricity need
approximately 30-50 seconds to start. To overcome this approximately one minute gap in power
supply, a test was designed for the Chernobyl block that should have utilized the rotating energy
of the turbines (that were still rotating after shut-down due to their mass and energy). The test
should have been carried out before the reactor was shut down for annual outage. On the morning
of April 25th, the power output was reduced according to plan from 3200 MW(thermal), to 1600
MW(thermal), but due to the request of the electricity utility in Kiev, the power had to be kept at
this level, to fulfil electricity demand. This output level was kept until about the end of the day,
which caused significant Xenon build-up in the reactor, introducing large negative reactivity. Next,
the emergency cooling system was shut off. It turned out later that this step was in fact authorized
earlier by the chief engineer. The INSAG review of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(1992) states however that this step probably did not affect the development of the accident. At
23.00 hours, the test started, and the power was further reduced to 500 MW(th), despite that
RBMK reactors are known to be very unstable below 700 MW(th). Unlike water moderated
reactors, RBMK reactors have positive void coefficients, meaning that a temperature increase
evaporates water, which is the primary coolant, but also a neutron absorber. But since graphite
is the moderator, the chain reaction continues, and with water converted to steam, reactivity also
increases.
Due to the above facts, the power output of the reactor dropped to 30 MW(th). At this point
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the reactor should have been shut down, and the test terminated. To increase power again, the
operators withdrew almost all control rods, in total over 200. But even with the withdrawal of
control rods, the power could only be increased to 200MW(th) due to the serious Xenon poisoning
of the reactor. According to the prevailing regulations, the permission of the chief engineer would
have been needed to run the reactor with less than the effective equivalent of 26 control rods. As
planned, additional water pumps were switched on to cool the reactor that resulted in lower water
levels in the steam separator (Böck and Villa (2011)). To normalize the levels and the pressure, all
but 6 manual control rods were pulled out, and the reactor shut down signals were bridged. The
cooling water flow was reduced to normalize pressure, and thus the heat removal from the core
was slowed. At this point, the operators did not realize there was any problem with the reactor
operation. The experiment started, in the course of which the turbine generator and the pumps
were run down. Half a minute later, the water started to evaporate, the temperature rose quickly,
the reactor became prompt-critical, due to the positive void coefficient. Steam formation became
uncontrollable and the staff pressed the emergency shut-down button, but the control rods were
dropping into the core too slowly. It is estimated, that the power reached 100 times of the planned
capacity, the temperature rose over 3000 degrees Celsius, the pellets of the fuel were breaking and
reacting with the water. Two explosions followed, one of them was either a hydrogen or a steam
explosion, and the second one was a prompt nuclear transient explosion of the fuel cloud (Böck
and Villa (2011)). The reactor cover lifted and about 8 tons of highly radioactive nuclear fuel
and parts of the graphite moderator were blown out of the reactor core. The incoming air reacted
with the graphite, building carbon monoxide that caught fire, and set the entire building on fire.
Besides this, radioactive iodine 131 and cesium 137 gases have escaped. About 250 tons of graphite
burned completely in the following 10 days, setting radioactive particles afloat (Villa (2008)).
The causes of the accident were partly a bad reactor design, including the positive void
coefficient, and the absence of proper containment structures, mostly due to financial reasons.
As the reactor was very tall, a concrete containment building would have doubled the costs. The
IAEA safety report on Chernobyl estimates the effect on reactivity of a total loss of coolant
around 4-5  for the steady state refuelling scheme, where  is the delayed neutron fraction
(International Atomic Energy Agency (1992)). Furthermore, the reactor core was massive, being
seven meters tall, and twelve meters in diameter, and thus chain reaction in one part of the
core was only vaguely connected to what happened in other parts of the core. This could have
resulted in significant spatial power redistributions. The control rods had a graphite displacer
at the end, which caused initially after the insertion of the rods a positive reactivity at the
lower part of the reactor. According to the INSAG-7 report, this positive scram effect of
safety rod insertion could have been a significant contributor to the reactivity driven transient
(International Atomic Energy Agency (1992)). Other pitfalls included according to the IAEA that
could have caused the augmentation of power were pump failures and the failure of the zirconium
alloy fuel channels near the core inlet at the bottom of the reactor. Another important fact is that
the minimum operating reactivity margin (ORM) was violated several times. All but six of the
control rods were removed from the core which was clearly against the operating regulations. The
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International Atomic Energy Agency (1992) notes that a “particular configuration of control and
safety rods was necessary for the positive scram to occur, and the double humped distribution
points to the fact that decoupling had occurred between the upper and lower halves of the reactor.
All of these conditions prevailed at the same time” (International Atomic Energy Agency (1992),
page 16). This deficiency was known to the Soviet engineers since 1983, but had never been
eliminated. Allegedly, the Leningrad Unit 1 accident in 1975 had been similar but was never
communicated.
Apart from the technical issues, the important causes of the accident also included deficiencies
in the operator training and the lack of in-depth understanding of the reactor operations, the
repeated violation of safety rules, and the poor quality and documentation of safety procedures
for this type of reactor. Presently there are eleven RBMK reactors in operation, in all of which
some upgrading of safety took place, such as the installation of additional absorbers and manual
control rods. The speed of the shut-down system was also increased. Furthermore the lower
limit of 700 MW(th) was set for continuous operations, and new computational codes for ORM
have been prepared. The fuel was enriched to 2,4% to compensate for additional absorbers. It
is noted by the IAEA that this will only lead to the desired effect if it is not used to extend fuel
life, in which case Pu239 would accumulate and contribute to the increased positive void fraction
(International Atomic Energy Agency (1992)). However, the safety is still largely dependent on
the timely and correct actions of the staff operating these reactors (Villa (2008)).
Up to today, the explosion at Chernobyl was the largest nuclear accident, spreading radioactive
material over large parts of Europe. It is at the same time notable that the atmospheric nuclear
bomb tests of the 1950s and 1960s have contributed to–depending on the geographical area
examined-– similar or higher radiation doses as Chernobyl for most part of Europe (Böck and
Villa (2011)). The accident caused two immediate deaths due to the explosion, and 56 deaths due
to very high doses of radiation, between 100mSv to 10 Sv (International Atomic Energy Agency
(1992)). There is a noted increase in thyroid cancers, and up to 4000 new thyroid cancer cases
are attributed to the accident, especially in the younger generation who were under the age of 4
during the time of the accident. The survival rates for thyroid cancer are luckily very high, up
to 99% as reported by the World Health Organisation (2005). No study found any convincing
evidence of leukaemia. The “liquidators”, about 200 000 men who participated in the cleaning-up
after the accident, were the group most exposed to radiation. Although the Soviet authorities have
measured the doses for the cleaning staff, the dosimeters used were very heterogeneous. According
to the report of UNSCEAR the average dose for the clean-up workers for the years 1986-2005 was
about 117mSv (UNSCEAR (2011)). The WHO estimates that about 2200 radiation caused deaths
can be expected in this group (World Health Organisation (2005)). In the first weeks following
the accident approximately 115 000 people were evacuated from the most contaminated areas
from Ukraine and Belarus. According to the SCK-CEN (2011) report on Chernobyl, “about 30%
of these people were exposed to doses lower than 10mSv, 56% to doses between 50-100mSv, and
about 4% to dose higher than 100 mSv.” Another 200 000 people were resettled in the following
years.
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The heavy nuclide (Zr95, Ce144 but also different plutonium, uranium, strontium, and barium
particles) have settled around the vicinity of the plant. The major long-range contamination
came from I131, and Cs137 both of which are gaseous/fine particle materials. Long term
contamination in Central Europe is found from Cs137, which has a half life of approximately
30 years. Caesium will remain in organic soils and many plants, especially mushrooms, can take it
up. A number of people despite the accident decided to stay in the contaminated areas. In these
areas, countermeasures were implemented to reduce radiation doses, such as the usage of artificial
fertilizers that limited the uptake of Cs137, or liming acid soils. Based on these countermeasures
radiation doses could be reduced to levels comparable to the background radiation levels. After
the downfall of the USSR however, due to financial reasons many of these countermeasures were
not administered any more, and the level of contamination increased significantly (SCK-CEN
(2011)). The WHO remarks that lifestyle disease and poverty cause currently much higher threat
to health than radiation exposure in the former USSR (World Health Organisation (2005)). It is
noted that myths and misperceptions of radiation have lead to “paralysing fatalism” among many
in the affected areas. Although Chernobyl was indisputably a disaster, the number of deaths and
expected deaths as well as serious health problems caused by the event are considerably smaller
than casualties connected to other forms of energy extraction, such as coal mines or oil extraction
in the corresponding period (Nuclear Energy Agency (2010)).
3.3.3 Fukushima (level 7)
The Fukushima accident originated in the earthquake of March 11th 2011 that resulted in 0.56 g
ground acceleration in the area of the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant, which was 20% above the
maximum ground acceleration plant design. Nevertheless, the structures of the plants were not
damaged at that time. The tsunami countermeasures were set at 5.7 meter, and as an additional
safety, the reactor building was set at 10 meter above sea level. The wave that devastated the
plant was, however 14 meter high. During the construction of the plant, Japanese engineers
worried that the diesel generators were set too low but the operating company, TEPCO, decided
to keep strictly to the original construction plants of the planner, General Electric. The Fukushima
Dai-ichi plants (1-4) were an early boiling water reactor type, built between 1971-1978 (Böck and
Villa (2011)).
Shortly before the seismic activity, the automatic scram system shut down the reactors. After
the earthquake, the electricity grid collapsed in Northern Japan. As designed, the emergency diesel
generators started, and supplied the power necessary for the reactor cooling. When a reactor is
shut down, residual heat continues to be produced from the decay products. The reactor has
approximately 6% of the full power output immediately after shut down, and about 1% of the full
power after one day, as decay heat is characterized by an exponentially falling function. About
one hour after the earthquake, the tsunami arrived and washed away the diesel generators. What
happened afterwards or exactly what processes took place and how much damage was done to
the core of the plants is still to be examined in the coming years. In the sections below, I will
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attempt to give the most likely course of events that followed the tsunami, based on Böck and
Villa (2011) and on the International Atomic Energy Agency (2011a) reports. The magnitude of
the Fukushima accident is well characterized by the fact that while in case of TMI or Chernobyl
we were talking about one reactor block, in Fukushima workers and engineers had to cope with
emergencies in four reactor blocks simultaneously.
The moment the power was lost, the heat removal from the core came to a halt and the work
of the reactor core isolation pumps (isolation condensers) were limited. It is estimated that 75%
of the core was cooled by steam only. Steam, as discussed earlier, has a strong negative reactivity
effect. When the temperature increases above 1200C, the zircaloy cladding of the uranium fuel
rods crack and begin reacting with water vapour, creating hydrogen and additional heat. The
produced hydrogen was pushed into the drywell. Consequently, hydrogen explosions occurred in
the reactor units 1, 2 and 3, allowing for radioactive gases and particles to escape, including mostly
xenon, iodine131, caesium 134 and caesium 137. The emergency troops - in order to keep the core
cooled – flooded the reactor with sea water, later also added soluble boron and boric acid, which is
a strong absorber (Böck and Villa (2011)). There have been claims that after the scramming the
reactors there could have been local events of spontaneous criticality (sustained chain reaction)
in at least two reactors. As the IAEA reports, the cleaning of the contaminated seawater began
in the second half of 2011 (International Atomic Energy Agency (2011a)). At the time of the
writing of this study it is not yet known in exactly what state the reactor core is in Fukushima.
The IAEA is constantly monitoring the situation, and publishes the newest information about
Fukushima each month.
Although four reactors at the Fukushima plant were damaged, the release of radioactive particles
(approximately 390.000 to 1.600.000 TBq) were approximately one third to less than one eighth
of the Chernobyl release (estimated at 5.200.000 TBq), which was a nuclear explosion (Hajek
(2012)). The number of evacuated people in Fukushima is estimated around 85.000, in Chernobyl
in total to about 315.000 persons. A significant difference is that the evacuation in Japan took
place within days of the accident. The estimated doses sustained by workers and population are
thus expected to be considerably lower than in the case of Chernobyl. The Fukushima Prefecture
estimates that about 292.000 people have received doses between 5-10 mSv, 43.000 between 10-16
mSv, which is approximately the dose received from an abdominal CT, 21.100 between 16-50
mSV, 3.100 between 50-100 mSv, and about 2.200 between 100-500 mSv, which classifies as a
very high dose (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (2011)). The long term health
impacts of Fukushima will have to be officially estimated, at the moment no immediate deaths
have been reported due to radiation illness (World Health Organisation (2012)). The significantly
contaminated land areas (higher than 600kBq/square meter) in case of Fukushima are estimated
around 600 km2 while for Chernobyl around 13,000 km2 (Hajek (2012)). Due to the above facts,
expert discussion began that two accidents should not be classified in the same category, or the
categorization should be extended to be more precise (Brumfiel (2011)).
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4 Empirical results: policy impacts of nuclear accidents
In the previous sections we looked at the recent history of nuclear energy and energy policy, as
well as at the development of reactor safety. Since the scope of this paper is to study the effects
of nuclear accidents on policy, I described the three most influential accidents in nuclear history.
Although there have been other INES 5 events next to TMI, they have received for various
reasons comparatively little media attention. After Fukushima, the German government in an
unprecedented reaction to a nuclear accident decided to phase out its nuclear energy program
until 2022, with the immediate shut-down of older power plants. At the time of this study
about 8 GWe capacity were disconnected from the grid in Germany. How much this decision
has been driven by strategic or by near-election political reasons is debatable. The German
decision followed the Italian phase-out and the Swedish referendum after TMI in the line of
after-accident policy reactions. In other countries such as in the United States and China, at the
moment we see little immediate policy effects of Fukushima. In the next sections I will look at
the main factors influencing reactor construction starts over the past decades, while controlling
for the effect of three accidents from 1965 on. It is often argued that high interest rates, inflation
and overcapacities have shuttered the nuclear industry years before TMI (Cohen (1990), Ebinger
(2011)). Looking purely at the construction starts, this seems plausible, therefore I test the effects
of real interest rates jointly with inflation on the annual construction starts, where possible.
Strategic security considerations such as energy security of a country are also claimed to play a
significant role in driving constructions, (Nelson (2010), Fuhrmann (2012), Gourley and Stulberg
(2010)). Utilizing these results, while taking into consideration the current concerns of energy
security and greenhouse gas emissions, I wish to look at the possible impact Fukushima is likely
to have on worldwide nuclear power plant construction.
4.1 Data description and methodology
I employ multiple panel and individual regressions on the net civilian nuclear capacity construc-
tions starts of 31 countries 1 from 1965 to 2009, while controlling for the general primary energy
consumption (E), as well as for real income (Y), economic growth, inflation (infl), interest rates
(r), the persistence of construction starts, and the three major accidents. The data related to
the capacity of nuclear power plants and construction starts comes from the IAEA. Power plants
abandoned in-construction after TMI are not included here, as only limited data are available
on these plants. One exception is the Shoreham nuclear power plant, which was licensed but
never operational. It is well-known that in the 1950s and 1960s many experimental design nuclear
plants were constructed, a good portion of which were shut down shortly for different reasons.
This turbulent early period of nuclear history is however excluded in this study by choosing to
examine the time period starting with 1965. The number of shutdowns after the accidents is a
1Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Romania,
Russia, Slovak Republic, South Afrika, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States
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variable, which could be potentially investigated, but as it turns out, no country has decided to
immediately shut down running plants after TMI or Chernobyl.
I control for the general development of primary energy consumption for countries with nuclear
power, by taking the primary energy data from the British Petrol Statistical Review of World
Energy database, from 1965 to 2009. Economic variables, such as GDP are sourced from the Penn
World Table 7.0. Inflation and real interest rates between 1965-2009 are taken from the World
Bank Database: World Development Indicators. Both datasets are unfortunately incomplete, often
starting in the 1980s and in the mid 1990s for the countries of the former East Block. This results
in the loss of very large amount of data when controlling for real interest rates and inflation,
therefore I decided to test different sets of models, with and without the real interest rate and
inflation variables.
The energy security variable for the period 1965-2009 is constructed as in Fuhrmann (2012), by
taking the World Bank’s measure of a country’s net energy imports (ENSEC2) as a percentage of
its primary energy use, multiplying it with minus one, rescaling and logging it.
ENSEC = log( ENSEC100 + 1)
Unfortunately the energy security variable database is incomplete and for many Warsaw Pact
countries starts only in the 1990s. The descriptive statistics relating to the main variables are
found in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables
Srescaled E Y ENSEC*
Mean 317,99 204,60 998.193,80 - 0,54
Median 1,00 70,93 361.448,40 - 0,46
Maximum 23.246,00 2.432,20 13.191.482,00 2,80
Minimum 1,00 6,05 22.846,07 - 2,38
Std. Dev. 1.252,89 388,51 1.713.977,00 0,75
Skewness 8,78 3,83 4,05 0,18
Kurtosis 113,94 18,18 22,62 3,69
Observations 1450 1346 1224 1217
* Source: Own Calculation, Descriptive statistics of the pooled
variables, S =construction starts in a given year (MWe),
E=primary energy consumption in given year (MTOE), Y=real
income in a given year (million USD), ENSEC*=rescaled mea-
sure of the World Bank’s measure of net energy imports.
4.2 Panel regressions and results
Construction starts–measured in MW(e) capacities–is our main dependent variable, which I regress
first in a panel setting, controlling for a lag of the dependent variable, due to the autoregressive
2”Net energy imports are estimated as energy use less production, both measured in oil equivalents. A negative
value indicates that the country is a net exporter. Energy use refers to use of primary energy before
transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indigenous production plus imports and stock changes,
minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in international transport” (World Bank Database:
World Development Indicators).
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nature of the series, for the lag of primary energy consumption, country and period fixed effects.
LogSi;t = 0 + 1logSi;t 1 + 2logEi;t 1 + i + t + i;t (1)
The construction starts in a given year in a country are denoted as Si;t, energy consumption
is denoted as Ei;t, country fixed effects are denoted with i, and time fixed effects with t.
Construction starts were rescaled by adding one MW(e) capacity to each year, to allow the log-
transformation. The results can be seen in Table 2.
Table 2: Accident Impact on Reactor Construction
0 logSi;t 1 logEi;t 1 LUCi;t TMIi;t CHERi;t trend i t
Accident Model I -4,99 0,31 1,30 incl incl
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00)
Accident Model II -0,74 0,37 0,37 0,34 -0,02 -0,82 incl not incl
(0,32) (0,00) (0,03) (0,06) (0,92) (0,00)
Accident Model III -3,18 0,31 1,23 -0,04 -0,15 -0,54 -0,05 incl not incl
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,82) (0,39) (0,00) (0,00)
* Source: Own Calculation, St 1 =construction starts in year t-1, Et 1=primary energy consumption in year t-1,
LUCi;t= Lucens accident impact, TMIi;t=Three Mile Island Accident Impact, CHERi;t=Chernobyl accident
impact, i=country fixed effects, t=period fixed effects. P-values are in parenthesis.
We can see that the series shows strong persistence, and both the first lag of primary energy
consumption and the lag of the construction starts is highly significant, with an expected positive
sign. The regression estimates that 1% increase in the primary energy consumption of the previous
year results in a 0,3%- 1,3% increase in nuclear power plant construction, while controlling for the
autoregressive parameter and optionally the effect of accidents. The significant positive persistence
parameter of the series supports the lock-in theory that countries, which have already invested in
nuclear infrastructure are more likely to build nuclear power plants. This supports the finding of
Fuhrmann (2012), and those of Miller and Sagan (2009) and Gourley and Stulberg (2010), who
claim the presence of historical inertia, and note that nuclear entrants in the past were likely
Warsaw Pact or North Atlantic countries. Apart from the evident historical reasons, the results
might be explained by the fact, that operating nuclear plants economically requires large economies
of scale, well-trained personnel, and adequate grid infrastructure to accommodate nuclear energy,
all of which need heavy initial investment. Of special interest are the period fixed effects in
Accident Model I, which we can see in Figure 1, showing a possible decrease of the positive fixed
effects already in 1976-77, and the permanent turn in the sign of the period fixed effects in 1986.
This means that while controlling for the effects of both energy consumption and the persistence
of construction starts, there was a global downward trend in the construction of new power plants
since 1986. Whether or not these period fixed effects can be explained by the accidents described
before, we have to test.
As a next step, I account for the influence of accidents on nuclear power plant construction.
The accidents chosen are Chernobyl and TMI, as well as the Lucens accident, which is the only
public INES 5 accident next to TMI in the examined time period. There were two other nuclear
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Figure 1: Period Fixed Effects (t) from Accident Model I
accidents in the USSR in the sample period that would rate level 5 (Smythe (2011)), but were
not made public and therefore not known at the time (Chernobyl 1982, Lake Karachay 1967).
All other INES 5 or 6 accidents happened before the examined period and therefore are excluded
from the dataset. In order to test the effects the above accidents have caused worldwide, it is
necessary to estimate the time length of the impact, which may differ from country to country.
To do this, I run individual regressions for all countries, allowing for the impacts of the nuclear
accidents to last for varying times.
LogSi;t = 0 + 1logSi;t 1 + 2logEi;t 1 + 3LUC1 41 + 4TMI1 31 + 5CHER1 24 + i;t (2)
I allow the Lucens dummy to take on the value of ”1” in successive time periods, allowing
for differing impact extents. The variable thus takes on a positive value first in 1969, then in
1969&1970, and then progressively covers the entire sample period between 1969-2009. Similarly,
I allow for the impact of the TMI accident to run from 1979 to 2009 and for Chernobyl, to run
from 1986 to 2009. What the optimal impact length of an accident is, taking into account the
other accidents, the constructions of the previous year and the energy consumption of the previous
year, I ascertain by running the entire array of models, in this case 41*31*24=30504 regressions for
each country. The optimal impact length has been determined by using the AIC sample selection
criterion, and the results are found in Table 3.
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Table 3: Accident Impact on Reactor Construction pro Country
0 logSt 1 logEt 1 L-IL LUC TMI -IL TMI C-IL CHER
Argentina 9,85 -0,11 -2,39 1980 -1,16 1981 1,78 1996 -0,72
(0,02) (0,46) (0,03) (0,10) (0,07) (0,21)
Belgium -8,57 0,00 2,82 1971 4,20 1985 -2,34 2009 -2,96
(0,30) (0,99) (0,20) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00)
Brazil -1,80 -0,30 0,52 1977 1,76 2009 -0,56 2009 -0,28
(0,51) (0,06) (0,50) (0,05) (0,63) (0,69)
Bulgaria -1,26 -0,57 0,42 1974 3,57 1983 4,17 1988 3,80
(0,73) (0,00) (0,73) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00)
Canada 21,47 -0,32 -2,83 1969 -5,52 1979 3,41 2009 -5,42
(0,02) (0,01) (0,11) (0,01) (0,07) (0,00)
China -7,73 0,40 1,70 2004 -2,66 2000 2,01 1995 -2,07
(0,05) (0,00) (0,01) (0,01) (0,02) (0,03)
Czech Republic -5,92 -0,03 1,61 1986 -0,58 1979 7,52 1987 3,57
(0,29) (0,70) (0,28) (0,08) (0,00) (0,00)
Finland -5,22 0,00 1,98 1975 3,52 2004 -1,54 2005 0,71
(0,19) (0,98) (0,15) (0,00) (0,05) (0,34)
France -24,64 -0,10 6,22 1970 -5,76 1991 1,92 2009 -8,81
(0,06) (0,42) (0,02) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00)
Germany 20,92 -0,28 -2,34 1969 -6,00 1985 -5,72 2009 -7,32
(0,42) (0,08) (0,60) (0,01) (0,00) (0,00)
Hungary -4,27 0,00 1,36 1974 1,48 1979 6,66 1992 -0,24
(0,27) (0,97) (0,27) (0,01) (0,00) (0,62)
India -1,97 -0,02 0,51 2004 3,02 1983 -3,41 1999 -2,85
(0,57) (0,90) (0,43) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
Iran -0,32 -0,19 0,44 1974 -1,12 1985 -1,33 2009 -1,71
(0,84) (0,24) (0,33) (0,06) (0,03) (0,03)
Italy -2,09 0,00 0,44 1970 3,43 1985 -0,08 2009 -0,14
(0,66) (0,99) (0,66) (0,00) (0,85) (0,74)
Japan 31,03 -0,20 -4,79 1983 4,06 2007 1,80 1993 4,51
(0,00) (0,19) (0,01) (0,00) (0,13) (0,00)
Republic of Korea -1,43 -0,11 1,58 1988 -2,53 2000 3,69 2005 -5,46
(0,59) (0,46) (0,02) (0,06) (0,00) (0,00)
Mexico -5,28 0,06 2,03 1975 -1,98 1985 -3,56 2009 -4,46
(0,10) (0,70) (0,03) (0,01) (0,00) (0,00)
Netherlands 0,00 0,00 0,00 1969 6,18 2001 0,00 2009 0,00
(1,00) (0,91) (0,98) (0,00) (0,82) (0,42)
Pakistan 4,49 -0,26 -0,95 2004 -2,67 2006 0,80 2005 1,28
(0,00) (0,08) (0,03) (0,00) (0,20) (0,04)
Romania 0,64 0,19 0,05 1981 -1,38 1983 2,31 2009 -0,84
(0,78) (0,16) (0,93) (0,01) (0,00) (0,11)
Russia 6,73 -0,12 0,26 2005 -5,81 2007 -2,55 1986 7,68
(0,08) (0,01) (0,65) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00)
Slovak Republic -4,53 -0,40 1,61 1988 2,72 1982 -2,83 1986 -3,03
(0,18) (0,01) (0,18) (0,00) (0,01) (0,11)
South Africa -5,02 -0,27 1,80 1975 -1,56 1985 -2,46 2009 -3,33
(0,20) (0,10) (0,09) (0,02) (0,01) (0,01)
Spain 15,08 0,04 -3,11 1972 -3,55 1980 5,00 1997 -1,07
(0,00) (0,74) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,11)
Sweden 28,63 -0,15 -7,44 1975 5,62 1980 7,71 2002 0,54
(0,00) (0,07) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,27)
Switzerland 11,69 0,04 -3,01 1972 -2,86 1985 -2,12 2009 -1,64
(0,19) (0,77) (0,30) (0,00) (0,04) (0,18)
Ukraine 0,00 0,00 0,00 1987 6,86 1986 1,10 1989 0,00
(0,77) (0,00) (0,77) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00)
United Kingdom -5,50 -0,03 2,33 2009 -6,80 1980 3,65 1988 2,23
(0,87) (0,84) (0,72) (0,00) (0,01) (0,05)
United States 5,37 0,22 0,30 1979 -1,05 2009 -7,72 1995 0,05
(0,30) (0,01) (0,65) (0,00) (0,00) (0,77)
* Source: Own Calculation, St =construction starts in year t, Et=primary energy consumption in year t,
LUC= Lucens accident impact, TMI=Three Mile Island Accident Impact, CHER=Chernobyl accident
impact, IL=lenght of impact pro country. P-values are in parenthesis.
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Clearly, some of the results, picked up by the AIC criterion, are highly questionable. It is
unlikely that Lucens had a lasting impact on Chinese, or Russian nuclear energy expansion. It
is the economic and political situation, and the fact that nuclear power plants have been built
only much later in China that the regression fails to model. Another serious bias we are facing
is that Russian and Ukrainian primary energy consumption data are only available from 1985
on, therefore earlier years have been ignored by the regression for these countries. Lithuania and
Kazakhstan have been excluded due to missing data. As next, I test each of these accidents with
differing impact lengths for significance, while controlling for the autoregressive component of
power plant constructions, primary energy consumption, and the other accidents. The coefficients
from these regressions as well as the corresponding p-values in brackets can be seen in Table 3.
In interpreting our results, caution is advised. We assume that the driving factors of nuclear
power capacity development could have been different in economies where the nuclear industry
was in private hand from the beginning on, such as the US, and in planned economies, with large
state ownership. The effects of central party decisions or of inherent energy security considerations
are econometrically very difficult to model. Significant positive impacts of “accidents” mean that
the years after the accident have not in fact caused a negative impact on construction, but brought
an increase with it. This is logical in case of 1969, which marked the middle of the Cold War,
and the beginning of the nuclear boom, and in case of 1979 as well, which was the first year of
the second oil crisis. We see however, that the model attributes a very strong significant negative
effect to TMI in the United States, which is consistent with the prevailing literature, and is a
result that we have expected from the beginning on.
The case of France deserves also an explanation, as by the middle of the 1980s approximately
65-70% of French electricity production was covered by nuclear energy, with the nuclear power
plants occasionally being temporarily ran down to avoid overcapacity. The decrease in nuclear
power plant construction in France thus could be more due capacity issues than Chernobyl. Lester
and Rosner (2009) also note that by today the French nuclear capacity exceeds baseload demand.
To avoid the ambiguous situation of interpreting the results individually, I construct a pooled
variable for each accident dummy, including the optimal impact length for each country, and run
the regression in a panel setting once again:
LogSi;t = 0 + 1logSi;t 1 + 2logEi;t 1 + 3LUCi;t + 4TMIi;t + 5CHERi;t + i + i;t (3)
The results (Table 2) without period fixed effects show a slightly positive effect of the Lucens
accident on reactor constructions. This implies that there was no negative worldwide effect of
Lucens, but the years following the accident have brought an increase in nuclear power plant
constructions. TMI had no worldwide effects at all. The coefficient is slightly negative but highly
insignificant, confirming the general view that TMI had mostly impacted on the US nuclear
industry but not on the rest of the world. Of most interest is the Chernobyl dummy, which is
not only negative as expected, but highly significant, meaning that all other effects held constant,
without Chernobyl there would have been on average 82 % more new power plant capacities in
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construction per year over the affected period. The length of the Chernobyl impact differs pro
country, as seen in Table 3, but it often runs until the end of our sample period. The results
including a time trend instead of the period fixed effects can also be seen in Table 2.
LogSi;t = 0+1logSi;t 1+2logEi;t 1+3LUCi;t+4TMIi;t+5CHERi;t+i+8t+ i;t (4)
We see that the trend is negative and significant, as is the Chernobyl dummy. Based on these
results, we would conclude that of all the examined accidents Chernobyl had a lasting and negative
consequence on worldwide nuclear power plant construction. An interesting question is the length
of the impact. We see that the significant negative impact of Chernobyl stops for the countries
China (1995), India (1999), and South Korea (2005) after a time span of nine-nineteen years. We
cannot find a negative effect of the Ukrainian accident on Japan. Gourley and Stulberg (2010)
also note that Japan and Korea were building at a substantial rate when others were not. This
implies that next to the question of energy dependence, the issues of physical constraints on
pipeline/transmission may compound the significance of the national energy security question.
The significant negative effect of Chernobyl does not stop until the end of the sample period
(2009), for the countries Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, South Africa, whereas
France, as mentioned earlier has almost full nuclear capacity to supply its electricity needs. The
dominance of European countries in this group could be perhaps attributed to the proximity of
the accident. Other European countries such as Italy, Spain, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania
and Switzerland also have negative coefficients for the Chernobyl dummy, although these effects
are not statistically significant, and the impact length is varying. An interesting case is Finland,
where not Chernobyl, but TMI is the variable carrying a significant negative impact, which lasts
until 2004. Finland was the first country to decide upon the construction of an EPR in 2005,
due to issues of energy security and environmental concerns. Another noteworthy case is that of
the United States, where in fact the construction of the first plants since TMI (Vogtle 3 &4) has
started, although this construction is not covered by our sample due to data availability reasons.
This could possibly–if the sample could be extended—end the effect of TMI after thirty-three
years. There were twenty-two reactors planned for construction in the USA as of the end of 2010.
Although these numbers are subject to change, the order of magnitude shows that the United
States, thirty-years after TMI is actively considering the nuclear energy option.
We see that the impact of an accident is likely to have a long lasting negative effect in the
country where the accident happened, and possibly in countries which were affected by the direct
consequences (nuclear fallout of the accident), or subject to severe public pressure. This is true for
the United States after TMI, but also for most of Europe after Chernobyl. No plant constructions
have followed Chernobyl in the Ukraine up to now, and the first NPP in Russia was built after
twenty years in 2006. Next to the United States, Russia presently also holds ambitious plans
with thirty-eight reactors planned for construction at the end of 2010. However, a correlation
analysis of the years of negative impact with the distance of capital cities to Prypiat has shown
no discernible pattern.
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4.3 A note on interest rate and inflation
The main reason for testing inflation and real interest rates where possible,—as many previous
studies, among others Cohen (1990) suggested–is the large financing requirement of a nuclear
power plant. These variables have been widely regarded by renowned authors to be of special
interest in market economies, where the nuclear industry has faced open market conditions. A
nuclear plant has to be authorized, built, connected to the grid, before it can start producing cash
flows. This meant at the beginning of the 1970s that utilities partly had to finance approximately
four years construction time. Inflation in the US has been already high starting in 1973, with the
first oil crisis. Real interest rates began to rise however in 1979 and stayed comparatively high
throughout the 1980s and even in the 1990s (Ebinger (2011)). TMI had certainly a regulatory
aftermath in the United States that foresaw stricter control and authorization process for nuclear
power plants. Coupled with resistance from the local population, this lengthened the construction
time and increased the construction costs of those plants that were already started before Three
Mile Island considerably (Harding (2007)). Presently, construction times in China, Japan or
South Korea are comparable to those of the US and EU standards at the beginning of the
1970s, despite of the much higher safety requirements regarding the site and the passive safety
systems. The real costs of an NPP in the USA and Europe have increased from approximately
1700$/KW to 4500$/KW in the last three decades. In these regions, the high investment and
financing requirements are often blamed to make nuclear energy uncompetitive against natural
gas or shale gas. On the other hand, the costs of nuclear power plants in the Asia-Pacific
region is considerably lower, around 2300-3000$/KW. This is partially due to different ownership
and financing structures, but also to lower labour and engineering costs and standardisation.
Joskow and Parsons (2009) note that with the accumulation of significant construction experience
everywhere in the world, construction costs are possibly going to decline significantly. A good
example is France which maintained low costs by working with large economies of scale and a few
suppliers (Morton (2012)).
At the same time the issue of political regulation surrounding the nuclear industry is also
essential (Toth and Rogner (2006)), as political decisions supporting one or the other energy form
are usually less “loud” and apparent than the German nuclear exit, but may play an important role
in future investments. The questions of the authorization process, government guarantees, fixed
electricity purchase prices, and the regulation when the costs of a new plant can be charged to the
customers are all critical in shaping the energy landscape and policy of a country. As an example,
the licensing process for building nuclear plants has been changed to make it more efficient in the
United States in the past years (Joskow and Parsons (2009)). The concerns of energy security,
(Fuhrmann (2012), Gourley and Stulberg (2010)), climate change (Joskow and Parsons (2009))
and the share of own resources may in case of many countries also play an important role in
policy as we see in China, South Korea or Japan, but also in the United States. While keeping
in mind the sociological and political environment of nuclear energy, I have tested where the
data availability allowed, the joint impacts of inflation and real interest rates on new power plant
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construction, while controlling for energy consumption, persistence and the major accidents.
LogSt = 0+ 1logSt 1+ 2logEt 1+ 3LUCt+ 4TMIt+ 5CHERt+ 6rt+ 7inflt+ t (5)
A full time series is available for the United States and for South Africa for the period between
1965-2009, while a partial series for France (1965-2004), Sweden (1970-2005), and for Japan (1971-
2009). Many other Western countries have statistics only starting in the 1980s. Another problem
is that due to the political transitions, most of the countries of the ex-Warsaw Pact only have
data starting after the mid-1990s, which results in serious loss of information and a clear bias.
The results can be seen in Table 4.
Table 4: Impact of Inflation and Real Interest Rate on Reactor Construction
0 logSi;t 1 logEi;t 1 LUCt TMIt CHERt ri;t infli;t i
United States 4,35 0,22 0,44 -1,14 -7,83 0,07 0,00 0,02
(0,48) (0,02) (0,58) (0,00) (0,00) (0,72) (0,99) (0,55)
Japan 1,51 -0,25 -2,10 6,06 3,13 5,88 -0,55 -0,24
(0,59) (0,13) (0,64) (0,01) (0,04) (0,00) (0,09) (0,14)
France -1,13 -0,15 3,28 -5,87 1,91 -5,74 -0,18 0,26
(0,48) (0,25) (0,33) (0,00) (0,06) (0,01) (0,48) (0,23)
South-Africa -6,63 -0,33 2,14 -1,69 -3,16 -3,86 0,07 -0,01
(0,10) (0,05) (0,06) (0,01) (0,00) (0,00) (0,15) (0,87)
Sweeden 6,03 -0,10 -1,56 4,37 7,83 1,28 -0,03 -0,03
(0,01) (0,28) (0,01) (0,00) (0,00) (0,09) (0,67) (0,57)
Panel sample 2,08 0,48 -0,19 0,01 -0,37 -0,87 -0,01 0,00 incl
(2,67) (0,00) (0,62) (0,99) (0,12) (0,00) (0,37) (0,68)
* Source: Own Calculation, St 1 =construction starts in year t-1, Et 1=primary energy consump-
tion in year t-1, LUCt= Lucens accident impact, TMIt=Three Mile Island Accident Impact,
CHERt=Chernobyl accident impact, ri;t= real interest rate, infli;t=inflation rate, i=country
fixed effects. P-values are in parenthesis.
For the countries examined above the individual regression usually shows the coefficients of both
the real interest rate and the inflation variables to be negative as expected, but non-significant. A
panel regression including the same variables for the entire dataset also results in non-significant
coefficients with coefficient values around zero. A test of the real oil prices for the panel dataset
also brings non-significant regression results.
4.4 A note on real income, economic growth, energy security and nuclear
proliferation
The primary purpose of the paper is to test the consequences of major nuclear accidents on
worldwide power plant construction. However, a few other issues that have been extensively
discussed in literature deserve a short explanation. One is the case of real income (Y), which is
claimed to be a major driver or nuclear energy, and was also found to be a significant positive
driver of nuclear plant construction by Fuhrmann (2012).Therefore after fixing the basic model
(Accident Model II), I have tested if including real income or economic growth changes my results
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significantly.
LogSi;t = 0+1logSi;t 1+2logEi;t 1+3LUCi;t+4TMIi;t+5CHERi;t+9logYi;t 1+i+i;t
(6)
LogSi;t = c+1logSi;t 1+2logEi;t 1+3LUCi;t+4TMIi;t+5CHERi;t+10logYi;t 1+i+i;t
(7)
The results of these regressions can be seen in Table 5.
Table 5: Impact of real GDP on Reactor Construction
0 logSi;t 1 logEi;t 1 LUCi;t TMIi;t CHERi;t logYi;t 1 dlogYi;t 1 i
GDP Model I 5,92 0,36 1,07 0,14 -0,09 -0,89 -0,74 incl
(0,04) (0,00) (0,00) (0,48) (0,61) (0,00) (0,02)
GDP Model II -0,38 0,38 0,12 -0,02 -0,80 0,10 incl
(0,86) (0,00) (0,55) (0,91) (0,00) (0,53)
Growth Model I -1,29 0,38 0,48 0,31 -0,02 -0,87 2,24 incl
(0,12) (0,00) (0,01) (0,15) (0,92) (0,00) (0,15)
Growth Model II 0,82 0,39 0,13 0,05 -0,69 2,22 incl
(0,00) (0,00) (0,53) (0,77) (0,00) (0,15)
* Source: Own Calculation, St 1 =construction starts in year t-1, Et 1=primary energy consumption in year t-1,
LUCi;t= Lucens accident impact, TMIi;t=Three Mile Island Accident Impact, CHERi;t=Chernobyl accident
impact, logYi;t 1=real income in year t-1, dlogYi;t 1=economic growth in year t-1, i=country fixed effects.
P-values are in parenthesis.
A test of the natural log of gross domestic product for the panel dataset brings in the absence of
primary energy consumption insignificant results, and in the presence of the energy consumption
variable negative significant correlation. It would be dangerous to assume however, that nuclear
power plant constructions are negatively driven by real income. The reason for the negative
coefficient could be that real GDP and primary energy consumption were cointegrated over the
examined period (Csereklyei and Humer (2012)), and so due to a misspecified multicollinear
model, the real GDP takes on a large negative, while primary energy consumption a large positive
coefficient. These results imply that a proper model specification would not include both real
income and primary energy consumption. While real GDP might be causing primary energy
consumption, it is likely that primary energy consumption is the variable that contributed directly
to nuclear plant construction, and not real GDP. The coefficients on the accident variables are
practically unchanged. The insignificant coefficient on real income in the absence of the energy
variable is in contrast with the findings of Fuhrmann (2012), as well as of Gourley and Stulberg
(2010). A panel regression of economic growth on reactor constructions brings also insignificant
results, with or without the presence of energy consumption. Another crucial topic to consider is
the question of energy security, discussed by Fuhrmann (2012), Miller and Sagan (2009), Gourley
and Stulberg (2010), Nelson (2010). Energy security is considered as a strategic issue, not only
relevant for the economy but also for national security. In case of diplomatic or military hostilities
a country that is heavily energy import dependent may be adversely disadvantaged without proper
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energy supply. Many decisions about nuclear strategy, such as those of France might have been
driven by energy security considerations. Therefore I test the impact of energy security alongside
with the effect of nuclear accidents on power plant constructions to see how the results presented
in Table 2 might change. The basic model tested together with the energy security variable gives
following results:
Table 6: Impact of Energy Security on Reactor Construction
0 logSi;t 1 logEi;t 1 LUCi;t TMIi;t CHERi;t ENSECi;t 1 @t i
Energy Sec. I -4,36 0,30 1,11 -0,33 incl
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,21)
Energy Sec. II 0,53 0,34 0,01 0,13 -0,09 -0,79 -0,90 incl
(0,59) (0,00) (0,96) (0,55) (0,61) (0,00) (0,00)
Energy Sec. III -2,05 0,29 0,95 -0,29 -0,23 -0,51 -0,53 -0,06 incl
(0,05) (0,00) (0,00) (0,19) (0,20) (0,00) (0,04) (0,00)
* Source: Own Calculation, St 1 =construction starts in year t-1, Et 1=primary energy consumption in year t-1,
LUCi;t= Lucens accident impact, TMIi;t=Three Mile Island Accident Impact, CHERi;t=Chernobyl accident
impact, ENSECi;t 1 = energy security measure in year t-1, @t=time trend, i=country fixed effects. P-values
are in parenthesis.
While the coefficient on the energy security variable is significant and negative, meaning that
energy dependency (insecurity) contributes to nuclear power plant construction, the impact
of accidents or the magnitude of their coefficients is almost unchanged. This outcome is
in line with the expectations. My results thus support the view that nuclear power plant
constructions worldwide have been mostly driven next to the increasing energy demand, by
historical circumstances, political and economic policy, as well as energy security considerations,
rather than economic factors. A simultaneous panel regression of the energy secuirty and real
income variables has not brought a change in either the signficance or the direciton & magnitude
of the coefficients. The Chernobyl accident seems to have caused an enormous worldwide decrease
in new nuclear plant constructions for decades, with the exception for countries where physical
barriers to energy imports made nuclear power to be a crucial national energy source.
The question what impact the possibility of nuclear proliferation has on energy policy is beyond
the scope of the study. Many studies identify the problems of possible nuclear proliferation (Miller
and Sagan (2009), Socolow and Glaser (2009), Fuhrmann (2012)) as a potential challenge and
constraint for the future of nuclear energy, especially if non-democratic countries were to acquire
nuclear technology.
5 Conclusion and implications for the future of nuclear energy
In this paper I investigate the effects of nuclear accidents on energy policy with the help of a panel
dataset of 31 countries from 1965-2009, using annual data about the capacity of reactors under
construction, primary energy consumption, as well as three nuclear accidents scaled INES five or
higher by the International Atomic Energy Agency. After determining the extent of the accident
impact in the different countries, I find that neither Three Mile Island nor Lucens had a worldwide
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negative effect on construction starts, while Chernobyl did. The effect of Chernobyl is however
shown to wear-off in certain geographical clusters, after ten to thirty years. Thus, an accident is
likely to have a negative and long lasting impact in the country where it happened, and possibly
in countries which were affected by the direct consequences, such as the nuclear fallout, or where
governments are subject to severe public pressure. I also find that nuclear capacity enlargement
shows a significant persistence, but it was also significantly driven by primary energy consumption
in the past five decades. After the test of real interest rates jointly with inflation, gross domestic
product and oil prices, I find the effect of these variables insignificant.
Recently, the Economist (Morton (2012)) published an article about nuclear energy, titled
“a dream that failed”. To the question why nuclear energy has not continued worldwide to
gain considerable share in electricity generation after the 1970s, the answers are complex, and
often interrelated. The golden age of nuclear power was certainly not only due to the inevitably
increasing energy demand, but also to political, military, security and strategic considerations. As
the political and sociological landscape changed, so did the environment surrounding the nuclear
industry. Massive anti-nuclear sentiments rose from the public following the TMI and Chernobyl
nuclear accidents, that resulted either in clear policy decisions against nuclear energy, or less
visible political measures such as the support of other energy forms over the nuclear option.
Nuclear energy certainly has to battle with a number of obstacles. One serious hindrance
is the widespread public perception. Nuclear power is frequently considered as a dreaded and
uncontrollable risk by the general public, without the necessary awareness for the safety record
and features of nuclear power plants, and without a basic understanding of the technology. Severe
public protests and voting behaviour may create for private utilities a changing and uncertain
policy environment, which might be highly discouraging. The enormous financing requirements
and long constructions times for a power plant are an equally potent stumbling stone. The
Economist (Morton (2012), page 3) argues that “in liberalized energy markets, construction of
nuclear power plants is no longer feasible.” Other energy forms with less safety requirement,
faster construction times, and much less regulatory requirements offer faster and safer return on
investment.
Has nuclear energy a future then? This is the point where we have to look a bit farther than
immediate investment decisions or next-month elections. Nuclear energy is the only energy source
which is both resistant against resource price fluctuations, has abundant resources and a secure
base load output. From the point of energy security it provides independence to many states from
energy imports, high price fluctuations and undisrupted energy supply in case of an emergency.
But even more importantly, nuclear energy provides clean energy. The impact of climate change is
not yet adversely felt in many regions of the world, however with the steadily increasing primary
energy demand from developing countries, the consequences of global warming will be inevitably
felt. To keep the temperature increase under two degrees Celsius, a drastic decrease in energy
consumption and serious improvements in energy efficiency would be needed. Princeton University
estimates, among others that deploying the double of the current global nuclear capacity to replace
coal based capacity would have the potential to reduce global carbon emissions by at least one
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billion tons per year by 2060, or one wedge (Princeton University (2011)). The economic damage
caused by the increase of sea levels and by adverse weather conditions are very difficult to estimate.
Next to best possible deployment of renewable energy sources, the performance of which is not
only fluctuating, but also land-intensive, nuclear energy, given that the problems of waste handling
and proliferation are competently addressed, offers a secure and concentrated long-term energy
option, with a potential to mitigate impending climate change.
These are the points that policy makers have to keep in mind also in the wake of Fukushima. We
have seen that the empirical results of this paper support the evidence of a strong negative reaction
of nuclear power plant construction to the Chernobyl accident. At the same time, the radioactive
contamination in case of Fukushima is estimated considerably less than that of Chernobyl, and is
concentrated closer to the damaged power plant. The conclusions of this paper indicate that at
least in Japan, the accident would have an aftermath on the number of new constructions. In fact,
on September 19th, 2012 the Japanese cabinet agreed on a nuclear exit strategy, however without
committing itself to any specific date (Reuters (2012)). This policy move is one, that was indicated
by our findings. Where and how far the negative policy impact of Fukushima might spread will
now depend on the objectivity of the media coverage, on the depth of technology understanding in
the public, whether or not there are existing nuclear infrastructures and know-how in a country,
but also on the existing political structures. We have seen that the impact-length of an accident
can, but need not “wear off” anywhere between ten to thirty years.
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